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THE MANDATORY REFERENDUM ON CALLING A STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: ENFORCING THE
PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO REFORM THEIR GOVERNMENT
By ROBERT J. MARTINEAU*
I. INTRODUCTION
Included in the constitutions of thirty seven of the fifty states is the
bold and provocative manifesto that the people have the right at all
times to alter or reform their government.2 This statement, which found
early expression in the Declaration of Independence,3 is generally con-
sidered to be another way of phrasing the principle that ultimate sovereign
power is in the people.4 The direct exercise of sovereignty by the people
of a state is, with one exception, limited to voting on statutory or con-
stitutional measures presented through the initiative, referendum or con-
stitutional revision procedures specified in state constitutions. In all
other situations the people have delegated their sovereignty to their state
government. Even the three acts of popular soveignty listed find their
source in the state constitution and not in the inherent power of the peo-
ple. There is, however, one aspect of sovereignty that does not depend
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. The author wishes to acknowledge the
contribution of Jon H. Kent, his research assistant, in the preparation of this article.
25 (1917). See also Forkosch, Who are the "People" in the Preamble to the Constitution,
19 CASE W. RES. L REv. 644 (1968).
1 The definition of "people" is discussed in HOAR, CONSTI ONAL CONVB-TIONS 16-
25 (1917). See also Forkosch, IWho are the "People" in the Preamble to the Constitu-
tion, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 644 (1968).
2 Alabama, art. I, §2; Arkansas, art. II, §1; California, art. I, §2; Colorado, art. II, §2;
Connecticut, art. 1, §2; Delaware, Preamble; Georgia, art. I, §2-501; Idaho, art. I, §2; Indiana,
art. 1, §1; Iowa, art. 1, §2; Kentucky, §4; Maine, art. I, §2; Maryland, Declaration of Rights
art. I; Massachusetts, pt. I, art. VII; Minnesota, art. I, §1; Mississippi, art. 3, §6; Missouri, art.
I, §3; Montana, art. III, §2; Nevada, art I, §2; New Hampshire, pt. I, art. X; New Jersey, art.
1, §2; North Carolina, art. I, §3, North Dakota, art. I, §2; Ohio, art. I, §2; Oklahoma, art. II, §1;
Oregon, art. 1, §1; Pennsylvania, art. I, §2; Rhode Island, art. I, §1; South Carolina, art. I,
§1; South Dakota, art. VI, §26; Tennessee, art. I, §1; Texas, art. I, §2; Utah, art. I, §2; Ver-
mont, c. I, art. 7; Virginia, art. I, §3; West Virginia, art. 3, §3; Wyoming, art. I, §1. Of the
other thirteen states, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Michigan and Washington
provide in their constitutions that political power is inherent in the people, Illinois, Wis-
consin and Nebraska that government derives its powers from the consent of the governed,
Louisiana that government originates from the people, and New Mexico that political power
is vested in and derived from the people. In addition, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington have constitutional statements
that all unenumerated powers are retained by the people. Only New York has no provision
that refers to any basic political right existing in the people.
3 That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute New Government . . . Dec-
laration of Independence, par. 2.
4 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47 (1849); Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d
716, 718 (Ky. 1966); Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 331-33, 37 S.E.2d 322,
328-29 (1946); Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 623, 33 S.E.2d 49, 53-54 (1945); Wells v.
Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 46 (1873); HOAR, CONSTITuTIONAL CoNvENTioNS 11-15 (1917).
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upon the state constitution but, rather, is inherent in the people of a
state-the power to revise their form of government by means of a con-
stitutional convention. The state constitutional convention has been de-
scribed as (in the field of constitution writing) the repository of the
sovereignty of the people-an all-powerful body, subject to no limitations
except those imposed by the people themselves and by the Federal Con-
stitution.5 It is through the constitutional convention and the subsequent
referendum on its proposals that the people are able to exercise directly
their right to alter or reform their government. The constitutional con-
vention has been considered so basic that the power to have a convention
has been held to exist even though the state constitution makes no
mention of it."
The usual procedure for a state to follow in having a constitutional
convention involves (1) a decision by the state legislature to submit the
question of calling a convention to the people; (2) a favorable vote by
the people; (3) the adoption by the legislature of enabling legislation
for the convention including providing for the election of delegates to
the convention and funding the convention; (4) the election of the dele-
gates. Under this process the holding of a convention is completely de-
pendent upon the legislature. A number of states have, however, at-
tempted to bypass the legislature by including in their constitutions not
only the statement as to the right of the people to change their government
but also a requirement that the question of calling a constitutional conven-
tion be submitted to the people at specified or minimum intervals. These
provisions direct that if the people in a mandatory referendum vote for a
convention, a convention be held, and they either are self-executing to the
extent that no further legislative action is necessary for a convention to be
held, or impose a duty upon the legislature to provide the mechanics for
holding a convention. At the present time, there are eleven states7 with
5 Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 616 (1865) quoted with approval in Board of Super-
visors of Elections v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 433-34, 229 A.2d 388, 397 (1967);
HoAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 128-48 (1917); DODD, THE REvISION AND AzuEND-
MENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 72-117 (1910); Note, State Constitutional Change: The
Constitutional Convention, 54 VA. L. REV. 995, 1012-16 (1968), Note, The Constitutional Con-
vention, Its Nature and Powers-And the Amending Procedure, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 390,
401-09; White, Amendment and Revision of State Constitutiops, 100 U. PA. L REV. 1132,
1139-47 (1952); Note, State Constitutional Conventions: Limitations on Their Powers, 55
IOWA L. REV. 244, 261-62 (1969). The principal exponent of the contrary view is JAIESON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 301-28 (4th ed. 1887).
6Harvey v. Ridgeway, - Ark. -, 450 S.W.2d 281 (1970); Board of Supervisors of
Elections v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388 (1967); Gatewood v. Matthews,
403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966), HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: ch. IV (1917); DODD,
THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 44 (1910); White, Amendment
and Revision of State Constitutions, 100 U. PA. L REV. 1132, 1134-35 (1952).
7 Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
York, Ohio and Oklahoma. Arkansas and Illinois will join the group if the new constitu-
tions adopted by the 1969 Arkansas constitutional convention and the 1970 Illinois consti-
tutional convention are ratified by the voters in November and December, 1970, respectively.
In the Appendix there is a state by state listing of the mandatory referendum provision of
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mandatory referendum provisions and, in view of the recent spate of con-
stitutional conventions8 and the trend toward the inclusion by these conven-
tions of the mandatory referendum in state constitutions,9 it is likely that
there will be an increasing number of mandatory elections on the issue of
calling a constitutional convention. Whenever the convention issue is sub-
mitted pursuant to a constitutional directive but the actual holding of a
convention is dependent upon legislative action, there is always the risk
that the legislature will not comply with its duty to see that a convention
is held. This has, in fact, occurred on several occasions in the past."0
The question presented by this situation is whether the judicial process
is available to force the holding of a convention. Up to the present
this issue has never been judicially determined, but the general opinion is
that a court in these circumstances is powerless." In this article, the
history and use of the mandatory referendum on calling a constitutional
convention will be reviewed, the advisibility of the different types of man-
datory referendum provisions will be assessed, and an analysis made of the
legal theories which are available to provide justification for a court to
make effective a vote for a constitutional convention and thus enforce the
people's right to reform or alter their government.
the state constitution, the date of each mandatory submission, the vote at each submission,
and a statement as to whether the vote resuled in a convention being held. The states are
listed in the order in which they adopted the mandatory referendum.
8During the period 1950-65, fifteen constitutional conventions were held. Sturm and
Craig, State Constititional Conventions: 1950-65, 39 STATE GOVT. 152, 152-53 (1966).
In the past three years Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Penn-
sylvania and Rhode Island have had conventions.
9 Since 1959 Hawaii, Alaska and Connecticut have included the mandatory referendum
in their constitutions. In addition within the last three years constitutional conventions
in Rhode Island and New Mexico incorporated a mandatory referendum in their constitutional
proposals but in both states the new constitutions were rejected by the voters. The 1969
Arkansas constitutional convention has proposed a constitution with a mandatory referendum
and the 1970 Illinois constitutional convention has voted to do likewise. In 1968 Florida
adopted a legislatively drafted constitution which authorizes a vote on calling a constitu-
tional convention only when the issue has been put on the ballot by an initiative petition. If
the vote is in favor of a convention, the procedure for calling a convention is self-executing
and not dependent upon legislative action. Fla. Const. art. XI, §4. The National Municipal
League's Model State Constitution also provides for a mandatory submission at least once every
15 years. Model State Const. art. 12, sec. 12.03(a) (6th ed. rev. 1968).
10 See infra at notes 15-17.
11 "[The decision to revise the constitution by means of a convention having been made,
it is the legal obligation of the legislature to provide for the holding of the convention.
Unfortunately, however, the fact that the people have voted for a convention provides little
assurance that the legislature will properly discharge its responsibility, as the experience
of Iowa well illustrates. Since the legislature cannot be mandamused, there is apparently no
effective legal remedy." GRAVES, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT 71-72 (4th ed. 1953);
WHEELER, Changing the Fundamental Law, in SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVI-
SION 59 (Wheeler ed., 1961); STUIM, METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 88 (1954);
HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 71-76, 117-18 (1917); Note, State Constitutional
Change: The Constitutional Convention, 54 VA. L. REV. 995, 1008 (1968); Note, The Con-
ttitutional Convention, Its Nature and Powers-And the Amending Procedure, 1966 UTAH L
REV. 390, 397; Dodd, Judicially Nonenforcible Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L
REV. 54, 78-80 (1931). The only suggestion to the contrary is found in Note, State Constitn-
tional Conventions: Limitations on Their Powers, 55 IOwA L. REV. 244, 252-53 (1969).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There have been a total of fifteen states which at some time in their
history have included in their constitutions a mandatory referendum re-
quirement."2 Submission of the convention issue pursuant to these pro-
visions has occurred on seventy-two 3 occasions. Twenty-nine times a ma-
jority of those voting on the question were in favor of a convention. Of
these twenty-nine pro-convention votes, twenty-one have resulted in consti-
tutional conventions being held.14  In the other eight instances a conven-
tion was not called, three times because of an outright refusal on the
part of the legislature to pass the necessary legislation,'5 and five times in
part because the constitutional provision was read to require a majority
voting in favor of a convention greater than a simple majority of those
voting on the question. 16  On one other occasion the legislature of New
York, after the people had voted for a convention, delayed the holding
of a convention for eight years' This could be considered at least a
partial non-compliance with the constitional mandate.
Three states adopted their mandatory referendum provisions prior to
1800, three in the period 1801-1850, four from 1851-1900, two more be-
tween 1901-1950, and four since 1950.8 Under the constitutions of the
first four of these states, the sole means whereby the constitutions could
be revised or amended was by a constitutional convention called pursuant
12 Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia, with Arkansas
and Illinois as potential members of this group. For more detailed information as to
each state, see the Appendix.
1:3 The number of submissions in each state are: Indiana, 2; Iowa, 10; Kentucky, 1 (submis-
sions occurred in 1797 and 1798 but because the issue had to be approved in each year to be
effective they are counted as one); Maryland, 4; Massachusetts, 1; Michigan, 7; Missouri, 3;
New Hampshire, 30; New York, 5; Ohio, 5; Oklahoma, 3; Virginia, 1. For more detailed in-
formation including the dates of the submissions, see the Appendix.
14The states in which mandatory referenda have resulted in conventions being held,
and the year of each referendum, are: Kentucky, 1797 and 1798; Michigan, 1866, 1961;
Missouri, 1921, 1942; New Hampshire, 1850, 1876, 1886, 1900, 1910, 1916, 1928, 1937
1946, 1954, 1962; New York, 1866, 1886, 1936; Ohio, 1871, 1910. For more detailed in-
formation as to each referendum, see the Appendix.
15 New Hampshire, 1861, 1864; Iowa, 1920. For more detailed information, see the
Appendix. Graves, State Constitutional Law: A Twenty-Five Year Summary, 8 \VML &
MARY L. REv. 1, 6 (1966) relates that in California the legislature in 1934 and again in
1946 refused to call a constitutional convention after the voters had adopted initiated pro-
posals for a convention.
16Maryland, 1930, 1950; Massachusetts, 1795; Michigan, 1898, 1958. For more detailed
information, see the Appendix.
17 See note 25, infra.
'
8 Massachusetts, 1780; New Hampshire, 1792; Kentucky, 1792; Indiana, 1816; New
York, 1846; Michigan, 1850; Maryland, 1851; Ohio, 1851; Iowa, 1857; Virginia, 1870;
Oklahoma, 1907; Missouri, 1920; Alaska, 1959; Hawaii, 1959; Connecticut, 1965. New
Hampshire had included in its constitution of 1784 a mandate that seven years after the
effective date of that constitution delegates were to be elected to a convention to consider re-
visions in that constitution. The convention which convened in 1791 drafted what became the
1792 constitution. COLBY, MANUAL OF THE CONSTrIUTION OF NEW HAMPSI-mt 140-45
(1902).
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to a mandatory referendum. The philosophy of these states would ap-
pear to have been that the task of changing the constitution was reserved
solely to the people and that the legislature was to have no role in it,
neither by being able to propose amendments nor by having specific au-
thority on its own initiative to call a convention or to submit the ques-
tion to the people. New York in its 1846 constitution was the first state
to combine a mandatory referendum provision with legislative authority
to propose specific amendments.' The committee of the 1846 New York
convention which proposed the requirement to that convention defended
it on the grounds that "it asserted a great principle, and that once in
twenty years they might have the matters into their own hands," but "if the
people were satisfied with the Constitution, they could endorse it, and the
state of things would continue. '20  Similar sentiments were expressed in
the 1850-5 1 Ohio constitutional convention and the New York Constitu-
tion was pointed to as an example to follow.2' The reason expressed for
the mandatory referendum in the 1857 Iowa convention-a desire to in-
sure that the people are able to exercise their right to reform their govern-
ment without interference by the legislature22-- has become the most
often articulated basis for it.23
There are two major points upon which mandatory referendum provi-
sions may differ. The first and most important is whether the section is
self-executing, i.e. once the voters speak in favor of a convention one will
be held without further action by the legislature. Of the eleven states
which now have the mandatory referendum, the constitutions of Alaska,
Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, New York, and New Hampshire are self-
executing, while Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Ohio and Oklahoma (plus
Arkansas and Illinois if their new constitutions are ratified) depend upon
legislative action to make them effective.24  There is ample justification
for a provision which is self-executing. This is the surest way in which
the avowed purpose of the mandatory referendum provision-to permit
the people to exercise their right to reform their government without
interference by the existing government-can be fulfilled. The self-
executing provision also avoids the problems necessarily involved in an
effort to obtain a convention through the judicial process. To the ex-
tent that conflicts between different branches of government can be
avoided, they should be.
'ON. Y. CoNST. art. XIII (1846).
20 NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CoNvENTiON COM.flTrEE, LEGISLATURE ORGAN-
IZATION AN) POwERs 365 (1938).
2111 DEBATES OF 1850-51 OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL CONvENTION 429-36 (1851).
221 DEBATES OF 1857 IOWA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 604-09 (1857).
23 See e.g., DEBATES OF 1950 HAWAII CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 748-49 (1961);
WHEELER, Changing the Fundamental Law, in SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
VISION 58-59 (Wheeler ed. 1961).
24 The relevant constitutional provision of each state is set out in the Appendix.
1970]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The other major difference between the states is on the question of the
majority required by the constitution to have a convention. Several of
the states have in the past required a majority of all those voting at the
election rather than a voting-on-the-question majority before a conven-
tion would have to be held. Experience has shown, however, that it is
almost impossible in a general election to have a majority even vote on a
constitutional issue, much less be in favor of a proposition. Now only
Maryland would appear to require the voting-at-the-election majority.
This trend is advisable because it avoids having the person who votes at
the election, but not on the referendum question, counted as a negative
vote. Treating his non-vote in this manner is a presumption that has
no basis in fact and thus should not be applied to the fundamental issue
of revising the state constitution.
III. JUDICIAL RELIEF F R NON-COMPLIANCE
In determining the availability of judicial relief to obtain a conven-
tion when the legislature refuses to act in accordance with a constitutional
directive, it should first be noted that the early mandatory referendum
provisions were not self-executing but depended upon the legislature to
call the convention and provide for the election of delegates. It was
not until the New York convention of 1894 that an attempt was made
to bypass the legislature and make the constitution self-executing. This
change resulted from the delay by the New York legislature in calling
a convention after the mandatory 1886 referendum favored a conven-
tion." It appears that New York and the other states which followed
its lead included the self-executing provisions because in their absence
it was thought that there was no means available to compel the legisla-
ture to call a convention after a favorable vote of the people. In those
states that do not have a self-executing provision, the philosophy is that
the legislature will comply with the vote of the people.26 As we have
seen, however, this assumption is not justified because legislatures in the
past have refused or neglected to comply with the constitution.27  In this
situation must a court deny relief on the ground that it cannot force
compliance with the constitution? There are several theories which indi-
cate that a court may be able to compel the calling of a convention and
thus make effective the people's right to reform their government.
The principle that a court lacks power to do anything in the face of
a legislative refusal to do what the constitution commands is based on
several different theories: (1) mandamus will not issue to compel the
legislature to pass legislation which necessarily involves the exercise of
2 5 NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITrEE, LEGISLATIVB OR-
GANizATION A PowERS 369-70 (1938).
2 6 See e.g., I DEBATES OF 1857 IOWA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 622-26 (1857).
2 7 See note 15, supra.
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discretion;28 (2) one branch of government cannot interfere with an-
other branch in the performance of duties exclusively committed by the
constitution to the latter.2 9  Both of these theories are generally encom-
passed by the concepts of separation of powers, political question and
non-justiciability."
One potential justification for judicial involvement in the calling of
a constitutional convention lies in the nature of the convention and the
role of the legislature in calling a convention. A careful analysis of
both of these issues was made by the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Attorney General.31  The people of
Maryland at a special election in 1966 had voted to have a constitutional
convention. 2  In considering the enabling legislation for the conven-
tion, an argument arose as to whether members of the legislature were
able to be delegates to the convention notwithstanding a prohibition in
the Maryland constitution against a person holding more than one public
office. The legislature caused a declaratory judgment suit to be filed to
determine this and other relevant questions, including that of whether
the legislature could delay the calling of a convention beyond the deadline
included in the 1966 referendum. The court held on the main issue that
legislators and other public officials could be delegates to a constitutional
convention. It reasoned that the Maryland constitutional prohibition
against a person holding more than one office applied only to offices
created by or under the constitution, that the office of convention dele-
gate was not an office created by or under the constitution, and thus the
prohibition did not apply.33 In deciding that a convention delegate was
not an officer under the constitution, the court held that a convention is
not an agency under the constitution but is the direct agent of the people
and exists independent of the constitution as the means by which the
people exercise their reserved and inherent right to alter or reform their
government. As corollaries to this, the court stated that the role of the
legislature in the calling of a constitutional convention is independent of
its law-making role assigned to it by the constitution, and that in par-
2 8 Re State Census, 6 S.D. 540, 542, 62 N.W. 129, 130 (1895); Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill.
510, 517-18, 152 N.E. 557, 560 (1926). Note, State Constitutional Change: The Constitu-
tional Convention, Its Nature and Powers-And the Amending Procedure, 1966 UTAH L. REV.
390,397; GRAD, THE DRAFTING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS pt. J1, 25-39 (1967).
29 Dodd, judicially Non-enforcible Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L REV. 54, 56-
61, 84-92 (1931).
30 The relationship between these three concepts is discussed in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 208-37 (1962). In this opinion the Court points out that the "nonjusticiability of a
political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." Id. at 211.
31246 Md. 417,229 A.2d 388 (1967).
32The legislature submitted the question to the people on its own initiative and not
pursuant to any spedfic constitutional authorization. The power of the legislature to do
this was one of the issues in Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Attorney General, id. The
court held that the submission was proper.
33 Accord, Harvey v. Ridgeway, - Ark. -, 405 S. W.2d 281 (1970).
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ticipating in calling a convention it is not carrying out its law-making
function under the legislative article of the constitution but is merely
assisting the people to perform their reserved constitution-making func-
tion." It can be concluded from this discussion that the reason the legis-
lature participates in this process is because it is a convenient agency for
doing so and not because the tasks ordinarily performed by a legislature in
calling a convention are inherently legislative in nature." If this view of
the legislative role in the calling of a constitutional convention is ac-
cepted, the problem of separation of powers, which arises whenever it is
suggested that a court either order a legislative body to act or act in place
of the legislature to effectuate the people's call for a convention, does
not appear to be relevant. The doctrine of separation of powers is con-
cerned with those governmental powers which are assigned by the con-
stitution-the legislative, executive and judicial powers.8  If as the
Maryland court has stated, participation in the calling of a constitutional
convention is not one of those powers, then separation of powers is not
applicable to it and it would not be a violation of the principle for the
court to play a role in it.
It could be argued that the Maryland case is not on point because it
did not involve the 20-year referendum required by the Maryland Consti-
tution but a referendum submitted by the legislature on its own initia-
tive. In the mandatory referendum situation, the duty is specifically im-
posed by the constitution upon the legislature to call a convention if the
people vote in favor of one. Even if the separation of powers doctrine
is not applicable when the constitution is silent on whose function it is
to call a convention, it does apply if the constitution imposes the obliga-
tion to call a convention upon the legislature, then no other branch of
government has the power to interfere with the legislature's compliance
or non-compliance with its constitutional duty. It is suggested that even
though the constitution does assign the duty of calling a convention to
the legislature when the people 'vote in a mandatory referendum to have
one, if the legislature refuses to comply with the people's directive, it
would not violate the constitution for a court to take whatever steps
are necessary to see that a convention is held. As has been pointed out
by the Maryland case, the role of the legislature in the calling of a con-
vention arises out of convenience, not because the duties involved are
34 Board of Supervisors v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 428-34, 229 A.2d 388, 394-
97 (1967). Accord, Carpenter v. Cornish, 83 N.J.L. 254, 83 A. 31 (1912); HOAR, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONvENTIONS 80-85 (1917).1 HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONs 75-78 (1917) comes very close to making this
point.
36People v. Bissel, 19 Ii. 229, 231-32 (1857). See generally, VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POwERs (1967); JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIMSTRA-
TIVE ACTION 28-40 (1965).
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legislative in nature.37  It would seem strange that a constitutional assign-
ment of a duty based on convenience could be used as a reason to deny
another agency of government, the court, the power to insure that the
vote of the people and the directive of the constitution are made effec-
live. Convenience would then become the master rather than the slave
of the ultimate objective-the right of the people to reform their govern-
ment.38 To deny the power of a court to do what is necessary to make a
reality of this basic sovereign right when the legislature refuses to carry
out its duty on the ground that the people in the constitution have given
to the legislature and to no one else the responsibility for assisting them
in implementing their right, is putting form over substance. If the legis-
lature refuses to act the people have no direct recourse except to the
courts.!" If the courts refuse to act, they have no recourse at all.40  The
result would be that the basic feature of our system of government, the
power of the people over the form of their government, is completely
frustrated, and all in the name of a constitutional provision designed to
insure that the people are able to exercise this power. It is doubtful
that the courts would be held to be powerless in those states in which
the responsibility for initiating the machinery for holding a convention
is assigned not to the legislature, but to the governor, lieutenant governor
or secretary of state.4 ' There should be no different result merely be-
cause the legislature rather than an official of the executive branch was
chosen as the agent to carry out the mandate of the people.
Several cases indicate that the traditional reluctance of courts to order
a legislature to act may not apply in the constitutional convention refer-
endum situation. In Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Attorney Gen-
eral42 the Maryland Court of Appeals, in discussing the issue of whether
the legislature could delay the convention beyond the period authorized
by the voters in the 1966 referendum, agreed with the trial court which
37 See discussion supra notes 34-35.
3SThe Prohibitory-Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700, 710-11 (1881) make the same point
in upholding the validity of a constitutional amendment which had been adopted by the
p-ople but had not been printed in full in the legislative journals as required by the exist-
ing constitution. Accord, Baker v. Moorhead, 103 Neb. 811, 174 N.V. 430 (1919).
39 Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 47-48 (1873) suggests that the only remedy is for the people
to elect new representatives who will call a convention. This, as HoAR, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS 76 (1917) points out, is not sufficient. Elections of a majority of the mem-
bers of a state legislature do not turn on such issues. Stubbs, Constitution-Mfaking in Geor-
gia, 6 GA. BAR J. 207, 212 (1944) suggests that if the legislature refuses to provide for the
election of delegates to a convention, the governor, pursuant to his duty to uphold the con-
stitution, is obligated to do so.
40 Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 47-48 (1873) makes the further suggestion that if the elective
process does not work there is always the right of revolution but this is hardly tenable, par-
ticularly in view of the responsibilities of the Federal Government under the guarantee
clause of article IV of the Constitution.
41 Alaska, Hawaii, Missouri, and New Hampshire. For the particular provision of each
state, see the Appendix.
42 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388 (1967).
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had held that the "convention was called by the Legislature and con-
firmed by the people. The General Assembly cannot ignore this mandate."
In submitting the issue to the people it "bound itself to the mandate
expressed by them. The people have spoken in dear and unmis-
takable terms, and the legislature is bound to obey. The only thing
remaining to be done is to provide for the election of delegates." The
Court of Appeals went on to say that "it was mandatory that a conven-
tion be called at this time and that the call could not be delayed. ' 43 The
court did not discuss what it would have done had the legislature refused
to take the necessary steps to have a convention, but it is unlikely that
it would have used the strong language it did, had it not been willing to
go beyond merely stating the obligation of the legislature under the cir-
cumstances.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Chenault v. Carter44 went even
further than the Maryland court when it described the function of the
legislature, once the people had voted for a convention, as a "ministerial
duty enjoined upon it by the constitution in the execution of a public
mandate. '4- The court also stated that the "choice of whether a con-
stitutional convention shall be called rests entirely with the electorate.
The discretion of the legislature is at an end when the matter is finally
proposed." 4
Another case in which a court has commented on the nature of the
function of the legislature once the people have decided to have a con-
vention is Carton v. Secretary of State47 in which the issue before the
Supreme Court of Michigan was whether the constitution adopted by the
1907-08 Michigan constitutional convention was to be submitted to the
people at the time directed by the legislature in the convention en-
abling act or on the date fixed by the constitutional convention. The
court held that it was within the discretion of the convention to deter.
mine when the constitution should be voted on by the people. In so
holding the court made it clear that once the people indicated they wanted
a convention the legislature's power over it was limited to providing for
the election of delegates to the convention. The court stated that the
power to provide for an election is the sole power conferred" on the
43 Id. at 445, 229 A.2d at 403.
44 332 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. 1960). In this case the court was faced with the question of
whether the legislature could submit to the people the issue of whether a convention,
limited in the areas of the constitution to which it could propose revisions, should be held.
The court held that the convention could be so limited, but that the limiting authority would
be the people by their approval of the referendum rather than the legislature by its passage
of the act providing for the referendum.
45Id. at 626.
46 Id.
47 151 ich. 337, 115 N.W. 429 (1908).
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legislature and that "the power then conferred [in the constitution]
is ministerial rather then legislative." '
The use of the words "duty," "ministerial" and "discretion" are signi-
ficant here because this is the language of the law of mandamus, the
general rule being that a court will issue a writ of mandamus only when
the duty of the public officer in question is ministerial and involves no
discretion on the part of the officer.49 These three cases, by the use of
language that is usually reserved for situations in which mandamus is the
appropriate remedy, have established the basis for a court to hold that it
has the power to compel the legislature to provide for election of dele-
gates to a convention and that in so doing it is not violating the separa-
tion of powers. A court should be able to accept the position that after
the people vote for a convention, the legislature's subsequent duty to
provide the necessary machinery to have an election of delegates to a
convention is merely ministerial and does not call for the exercise of
discretion. Having adopted this view, a court could legitimately rule that
the legislature is subject to a writ of mandamus to carry out its consti-
tutional duty. In carrying out a non-legislative ministerial duty the leg-
islature, as well as the executive and other public officers, is subject to
being ordered by a court to perform its duty.
Apart from enforcing a ministerial duty of the legislature, it can also
be maintained that the "right to reform" supposedly guaranteed by the
constitution is not merely an indefinite and vague "right of the people"
not belonging to anyone in particular but is rather a right that is indi-
vidual and personal and capable of being enforced by the courts. When
a constitution states that it is the "right" of the people to reform their
government, what does the use of the word "right" imply? It should be
noted that the term is not used extensively in the body of state constitu-
tions even though every constitution has a portion of it designated as a
bill or declaration of rights.50 These bills or declarations generally con-
tain what are commonly thought of as "rights," i.e., affirmative or nega-
tive commands to the government for the protection of the individual,
but they also include many other statements which are mere expressions
of political philosophy. 1  Is the "right" to reform the government a true
"right" or just a statement of political philosophy? Up to the present
the judicial reliance on the "right" has been to justify some action lead-
ing to constitutional reform but not as a basis for affirmative judicial
action to compel a legislature to comply with the wishes of the people
48 Id. at 341, 115 N.W. at 431.
40JAFFB, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADINISTRATIVE ActnoN 176-92 (1965).
GOForce, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance,
3 VAL. U. L REV. 125, 137 (1969).
51 The various provisions of the Bills of Rights are set forth in the Appendix to id. at 164-82.
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as expressed in a referendum.52  It is suggested that by the use of the
word "right" in relation to the control the people have over their gov-
ernment, something more is meant than sheer power or authority. 3 If
those words or words of similar import were intended, they, rather than
the word "right", would have been included in the constitution and it
would have been understood by all that the statement was nothing more
than a recognition of the obvious, that if the people are successful in
forcibly taking power into their own hands notwithstanding the opposi-
tion of existing governmental institutions, they can reform their govern-
ment and cannot be called to account for it. But the word "right" was
used, and in a society which is premised upon the recognition by the gov-
ernment of the rights guaranteed by the constitution and upon a judicial
process designed to enforce those rights, it must be assumed that the
constitutional draftsmen and the people who adopted the constitution did
so with full knowledge of its significance.
Under the "right" theory, it can be argued that the legislature should
be compelled to provide for a convention on the basis that it is denying
an individual's right to reform his government after he and others had
been a majority in a referendum on the question of holding a convention.
Once the people have attempted to guarantee the right by constitutionally
mandating a periodic vote on calling a convention and by commanding
that in the event of a favorable vote a convention must be held, the
"right" to reform is no longer only a general statement of principle but
something to which a person who voted for a convention is entitled as a
matter of constitutional guarantee. There would be little point in the
constitutional draftsmen adding to the constitution this mandatory
machinery designed to result in a convention being held when the people
so desire, if the legislature is free to disregard the wishes of the people
and the people are left without recourse. The objective of the manda-
tory provision is to do away with the necessity for reliance on the legisla-
ture and thus enable the people to exercise their right to reform their
government without interference. This is shown by the debates in the
constitutional conventions which adopted the mandatory provisions.
In Iowa, for example, in the debate on the periodic mandatory vote, those
who favored it stressed the importance of permitting the people to exer-
cise their right to reform their government without having to rely on the
existing government. 4 The example of Doar's Rebellion in Rhode Is-
52 See e.g., Harvey v. Ridgeway, - Ark. -, 450 S.W.2d 281 (1970); Board of Super-
visors of Elections v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388 (1967); Re Opinion of
the Justices 55 R.I. 56, 178 A. 433 (1935); Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 200 Ga. 323, 37
S.E.2d 322 (1946); Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (1966); Cummings v. Beeler, 189
Tenn. 151, 223 S.W.2d 913 (1949); Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 33 S.E.2d 49 (1945).
5 3 Braxton, Powers of Conventions, 7 VA. L. REG. 79,81 (1901).
541 DEBATES OF 1857 IowA CONsTiTuTioNAL CoNVENIoN 604-09 (1857).
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land in 1842, as related in the case of Luther v. Borden,5 was cited to
show what can happen when the people's inherent right to reform their
government is blocked by the government in power.r The mandatory
referendum is, consequently, intended to be an alternative to armed revo-
lution. But if there is no way to have a convention when the legislature
refuses to act, the people are in the same position as had the mandatory
referendum not been placed in the constitution, that is with armed
revolt as the only recourse open to a people who want to exercise their
right to reform their government. Such a result could hardly have been
intended by those who included the mandatory referendum in the con-
stitution. It seems reasonable to conclude that what was intended by
the adoption of the mandatory referendum was not only that a vote
would be taken, but that if the vote were in favor of a convention, a con-
vention would be held. It was certainly not the intention of the drafts-
men that the legislature would still have the discretion as to whether a
convention would occur.
The case usually cited in support of the proposition that the calling
of a constitutional convention is completely subject to the will of the
legislature notwithstanding a vote of the people in favor of a conven-
tion is Wells v. BainY7  In that case the narrow issue before the court
was whether a convention has the authority to control the procedures at
the election at which the constitution drafted by the convention was to
be accepted or rejected by the voters. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that because the enabling act for the convention provided that the
referendum on the constitution was to be conducted in the same manner
as other general elections, the convention could not establish a different
procedure. In so holding, the court made an extensive analysis of the
status and power of a constitutional convention and, in particular, of the
convention's relationship to the legislature and to the people. The
court's discussion was based on its construction of the section of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution preserving the right of the people to alter or reform
their government. The court stated that there were three ways in which
this right could be executed: "(1) The mode provided in the existing
constitution. (2) A law as the instrumental process of raising the body
for revision and conveying to it the powers of the people. (3) A revo-
lution.'" 8 The court in its opinion was only concerned with the situation
described in the second alternative, that is when the constitution itself
does not regulate the manner in which a convention is to be called. The
first alternative was inapplicable because the Pennsylvania Constitution
did not provide for the calling of a constitutional convention. Thus,
5 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 1849.
50 1 DEBATES OF 1857 IowA CoNSiTuTiONA CONVENTrON 609, 623-24 (1857).
57 75 Pa. 39 (1873).
58 Id. at 47-48.
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the entire discussion by the court is irrelevant to the situation in which
the constitution does specify the duty of the legislature to call a conven-
tion. It should also be noted that Wells v. Bain is inconsistent with the
Maryland case, Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Attorney General,r9
and with the thinking of most other courts in its view that, when the
people vote for a convention in a referendum proposed by the legislature
on its own initiative, the vote merely authorizes the legislature to call a
convention but is not a mandate on the legislature to do so.
Several provisions of the United States Constitution are also possible
bases for judicial enforcement of the people's call for a convention. The
federal claim most likely to be accepted by a court is one based on the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Adapting the prin-
ciple of the reapportionment cases to the refusal of a state government to
comply with a convention referendum, it appears that this action of the
state government is a denial of the effectiveness of an individual's vote
in an even more direct way than is a malapportionment of legislative
seats.60 In the reapportionment situation, the impact of the failure to
give equal weight to each person's vote is complicated by the vagaries
of the legislative process and the other factors which militate against the
one man-one vote principle achieving the desired result."' It has, in fact,
only the advantage of mathematical symmetry. In the situation of a
legislature's refusal to abide by a convention referendum, however, the
effectiveness of the vote of a person who favors a convention is not
merely being reduced, it is being denied completely. The result is the
same as if the election officials had torn up all the ballots in favor of a
convention or had refused to permit those who favored a convention to
cast their vote.
It can also be argued that the right to reform the government is one
of those fundamental rights contained in the concept of liberty pro-
tected by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. It has been recognized that the due process clause "protects
those liberties that are so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental,"" including the right to pri-
vacy,62 the right to travel, 4 and the right to educate one's children. 0 It
is suggested that the most fundamental of all rights is the right of the
59 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388 (1967).
60 For another possible application of the equal protection clause to a voting situation see
Note, Superinajority Voting Requirements: Possible Constitutional Objections, 55 IowA L.
REv. 674 (1970).
61 Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote," 1969
Sup. CT. REv. 219.
62 Justice Goldberg, concurring in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
63 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
6 5 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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people and of the individuals who constitute the people to reform their
government. This right was recognized in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as a justification for the American Revolution. 6 It is recog-
nized in most state constitutions,67 and it has been held that the right
exists even if not specifically mentioned in the constitution. 8  It is
consequently one of the most basic of all fundamental rights and thus
is within the liberty protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Another argument that can be made is that the ninth amendment is
a basis for recognizing the existence and enforceability of the right to re-
form the government. The ninth amendment, which provides that "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people," has recently been
used to justify the judicial recognition of rights not specifically men-
tioned in the Constitution. 9 In view of the fundamental nature of the
right to reform the government, it seems logical to include it within those
unenumerated rights recognized by the ninth amendment.
The guarantee of a republican form of government contained in sec-
tion 4, article IV of the Constitution70 can also be used as a foundation
for judicial relief. The essential concept of a republican form of gov-
ernment is that the ultimate control over the government resides in the
people.7'1 If this is the case, and if it is the responsibility of the federal
government to guarantee this control, then it seems appropriate that
when a state government refuses to follow the command of the people
as expressed in a convention referendum, a federal court, as one of the
institutions established to insure that the Constitution is observed, or a
state court, which has a similar obligation to uphold the federal Consti-
tution, must take appropriate steps to insure that a reluctant state govern-
ment maintains a republican form of government by complying with the
mandate of the people as expressed in a referendum established by the
state constitution.72
C6 Note 3, suPra.
07 Note 2, supra.
08 See the cases and authorities cited in note 6, supra.
09 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg
at 486 (right of privacy).
70 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government..."
7 1 Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional
Desuetudo, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513,558 (1962).
72The major difficulty with this thesis is that in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the
Court specifically held that a case arising under the guarantee clause was a non-justiciable
political question and that a case involving the apportionment of a state legislature was
justiciable because it involved the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
not the guarantee clause of article IV. This rationale was criticized by Justice Frankfurter
in his dissent in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 297, and by Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light
on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CAL. L. REV. 245 (1962).
In Kobler v. Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. .a. 1968), aff'd 393 U.S. 531 (1969), two mem-
1970]
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There are two major hurdles which a court would have to face in
considering a suit seeking relief from a legislative refusal to call a con-
stitutional convention. The first deals with the power of the court to
hear the case and the second with the type of relief which the court can
grant. A court would initially be confronted with objections to its juris-
diction to hear the case on the grounds that the issue was not justici-
able, was a political question or was a violation of the separation of
powers, or a combination of all three. Essentially, no matter how it
is phrased, the issue involves the propriety of a court considering the
matter of the legislative refusal to take action when the constitution
says it must do so. If the claim is based upon the alleged violation of
a federal constitutional right, Baker v. Cart14 would appear to eliminate
any serious question as to the jurisdiction of the court. That case makes
it dear that the limitations of justiciability, political question and separa-
tion of powers do not apply to a suit alleging that a federal constitutional
right has been violated by a refusal by a state legislature to act.75 This
was, of course, the exact situation presented in the apportionment cases.
Similarly, there is no problem in a court taking jurisdiction of a
case in which the plaintiff's claim is based on the theory that the duty of
the legislature in calling a convention after a referendum in favor of one
is merely ministerial and does not call for the exercise of legislative dis-
cretion. If a court agrees with that theory it merely applies the usual
mandamus principles.70 Any problem arising from traditional notions of
separation of powers can be avoided by a recognition of the fact that a
legislature, when it deals with the question of a constitutional conven-
tion, is not exercising normal legislative power but a special power as-
signed to it as a matter of convenience to assist the people in exercising
their sovereign right to revise their constitution. A court, by refusing to
act in such circumstances, would not be respecting a constitutional limi-
tation on its powers but merely permitting a designated agent of the peo-
ple not to do what the people have said it must do. 77
Even if a court does accept jurisdiction of the case and holds that
the plaintiff is entitled to relief, is there any relief which the court is able
to grant? Again, the reapportionment cases may provide the basis for an
hers of a three judge panel were of the opinion that under some circumstances the guarantee
clause might be judicially enforceable.
73 See the discussion at notes 28-36, supra.
74 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
75 "[it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Fed-
eral Government and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States which give rise
to the 'political question'." Id. at 210. Cases involving the guarantee clause of article IV
are an exception to this statement because the Court has construed that clause to be enforce-
able by other branches of the Federal Government. Id. at 218-25.
76 See the discussion at notes 42-49, supra.
77 See the discussion at notes 28-36, supra.
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affirmative answer. In those cases the courts have at first delayed
granting relief to permit the state legislatures to have an opportunity to
reapportion themselves. The courts then have reviewed the reapportion-
ment measures adopted by the state legislatures, and if they still did
not meet the requirements of equal protection, the judges themselves
have reapportioned the legislatures.7 Applying this precedent to the
convention problem, a court could direct that unless the legislature en-
acted by a certain date the legislation appropriate for a convention, the
court would enter an order which would include the same provisions as
would be in an enabling act.
It is at this point that the most substantial objection to a court assum-
ing a role in the calling of a constitutional convention arises. It is ob-
vious that in calling a constitutional convention there are several details
concerning the election and compensation of delegates and operating
funds for the convention which may involve the exercise of discretion on
matters ordinarily the subject of legislative action. Particularly difficult
for a court would be the questions of the number of delegates, the dis-
tricts from which they would be elected, and whether the election would
be partisan or non-partisan.79 Presumably, to the extent of reasonable
applicability, the election would be held in the same manner as other state
elections. If the state constitution does not specify the essential provi-
sions for the election of the delegates to the convention, the court is
not without any guidance in the matter. It could, for example, merely
follow the pattern set by the most recent constititional convention held
in that state or, if for some reason that was not practical, it could use
the existing state legislature, or one house thereof, as its model.
The question of providing funds for the convention is just as diffi-
cult. State constitutions do not, with one exception, 0 specify that a con-
vention may spend whatever it deems appropriate. To the contrary, in
most states public funds may not be expended without a legislative
appropriation. Notwithstanding this, it would seem that if the state
constitution commands that under certain circumstances a convention be
held and the sole purpose of the judicial proceeding is to achieve compli-
ance with the constitution, it would not be inconsistent with the constitu-
tion for a court to authorize the expenditure of state funds for a conven-
tion. Again it comes down to a question of not permitting the legisla-
ture to negate the fundamental right of the people to reform their
78 See DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: RIEAPPORTIONmiENT IN LAW AND POLI-
Tics ch. 12 (1968).
79 Under some constitutions these matters would not prove a problem because most of these
details are specified in the constitutions themselves. See e.g., the HAWAII CONSr. art. Xv,
§1. All the court would have to do is order the state or local officials in charge of election to
hold an election on a certain date.
8 0 MssouRi CONsT. art XII, §3(b).
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government by a refusal to act when it has a constitutional obligation to
act.81
The court need not consider any issues beyond the election of the dele-
gates to the convention and making sure that the convention is funded.
Other matters such as when the convention begins, how long it sits, what
votes are necessary for it to take action, and when the constitution it
adopts is to be submitted to the people, are all matters which are properly
left to the convention, although most legislatures attempt to control
these details by means of the enabling legislation for the convention. 2
IV. CONCLUSION
It is dear that notwithstanding the central place in our political sys-
tem of the right of the people to reform their government, without a
mandatory referendum on calling a constitutional convention this right
is dependent upon legislative action which often is not forthcoming.
Unless the people have voted for a convention, judicial relief from a
refusal of the legislature to act is not possible because, among other rea-
sons, there is no way in which a court can determine whether the people
actually desire to exercise this right. As a response to this problem, an
increasing number of states, including eleven at the present time, have
included in their constitutions a provision which requires that the ques-
tion of calling a constitutional convention be submitted to the people at
stated or minimum intervals and, if the requisite majority of voters
favors a convention, either imposes upon the legislature the duty to pro-
vide the mechanics for the holding of a convention or is self-executing
to the extent that a convention will be held without further action of
the legislature. The self-executing provision is preferable, because leg-
islatures can and have refused to call a convention on several occasions
when the people have voted in favor of having a convention. It has
been accepted up to now that in the face of a legislative refusal to comply
with a vote of the people for a convention, the courts are powerless
to order the legislature to do what the constitution says it must do. Sev-
eral recent cases have, however, suggested a number of legal bases for a
court to take the action necessary for a convention to be held. These
bases include the several federal constitutional provisions and an under-
standing of the role of the legislature in calling a constitutional con-
vention. Whatever basis is used, it is suggested that a court need no
longer stay its hand in the face of legislative opposition to the holding of
a constitutional convention called for by the people in a constitution-
8 1 HoAR, CONSTrUTIONAL CoNvENTIoNS 177-80 (1917) suggests that a convention
has the inherent power to incur whatever expenses it deems necessary. But see Constitu-
tional Convention v. Evans, -N.M. -, 460 P.2d 250 (1969).
8 2 Note, State Constitutional Conventions: Limitations on Their Powers, 55 IowA L. REV.
244 (1969).
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ally mandated referendum. In this way the fundamental right of the
people to reform their government can be protected.
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1 In order the more effectually to adhere to the principles of the constitution, and to cor-
rect those violations which by any means may be made therein, as well as to form
such alterations as from experience shall be found necessary, the general court which
shall be in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, shall
issue precepts to the selectmen of the several towns, and to the assessors of the un-
incorporated plantations, directing them to convene the qualified voters of their re-
spective towns and plantations, for the purpose of collecting their sentiments on
the necessity or expediency of revising the constitution, in order to amendments.
And if it shall appear, by the returns made, that two-thirds of the qualified voters
Cq cr
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throughout the state, who shall assemble and vote in consequence of the said precepts,
are in favor of such revision or amendment, the general court shall issue precepts, or
direct them to be issued from the secretary's office, to the several towns to elect
delegates to meet in convention for the purpose aforesaid.
The said delegates to be chosen in the same manner and proportion as their repre-
sentatives in the second branch of the legislature are by this constitution to be
chosen.
2 Morison, The Vote of Mfassachusetts on Summoning a Constitutional Convention, 1776-
1916,50 MASS. I-DST. Soc. PRoc. 241,247 (1917).
3 No convention was called because the constitution required a two-thirds majority in
favor of a convention before one was to be called.
4 The New Hampshire Constitution of 1792, part II, section 99 provided:
It shall be the duty of the selectmen and assessors of the several towns and places in
this State, in warning the first annual meetings for the choice of senators, after the
expiration of seven years from the adoption of this constitution as amended, to in-
sert expressly in the warrant this purpose among others for the meeting, to wit:
to take the sense of the qualified voters on the subject of a revision of the constitution;
and the meeting being warned accordingly, and not otherwise, the moderator shall take
the sense of the qualified voters present as to the necessity of a revision; and a return
of the number of votes for and against such necessity shall be made by the clerk,
sealed up, and directed to the general court at their then next session; and it if shall
appear to the general court, by such return, that the sense of the people of the State
has been taken, and that, in the opinion of the majority of the qualified voters in the
State, present and voting at the said meetings, there is a necessity for a revision of the
constitution, it shall be the duty of the general court to call a convention for that pur-
pose; otherwise the general court shall direct the sense of the people to be taken,
and then proceed in the manner before mentioned; the delegates to be chosen in
the same manner and proportioned as the representatives to the general court:
Provided, That no alterations shall be made in this constitution before the same
shall be laid before the towns and unincorporated places, and approved by two-
thirds of the qualified voters present and voting on the subject.
Section 100 provided:
"And the same method of taking the sense of the people as to the revision of the constitu-
tion, and calling a convention for that purpose, shall be observed afterward, at the expira-
tion of every seven years:'
Articles 99 and 100 were amended in 1964 to provide, in part:
Amendments to this constitution may be proposed by the general court or by a con-
stitutional convention selected as herein provided.
(a) The senate and house of representatives, voting separately, may propose amend-
ments by a three-fifths vote of the entire membership of each house at any session.
(b) The general court, by an affirmative vote of a majority of all members of both
houses voting separately, may at any time submit the question 'Shall there be a con-
vention to amend or revise the constitution?' to the qualified voters of the state.
If the question of holding a convention is not submitted to the people at some time
during any period of ten years, it shall be submitted by the secretary of state at the
general election in the tenth year following the last submission. If a majority of
the qualified voters voting on the question of holding a convention approves it, dele-
gates shall be chosen at the next regular general election, or at such earlier time as
the legislature may provide, in the same manner and proportion as the representa-
tives to the general court are chosen. The delegates so chosen shall convene at such
time as the legislature may direct and may recess from time to time and make such
rules for the conduct of their convention as they may determine.
The election results for the years 1800, 1807, 1821, 1833, 1834, 1838, i844, 1847, 1850,
1858, 1861, 1863, 1864, 1876, 1884, 1886, 1894, 1896 and 1900 are found in COLBY,
MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF NEW HAmspsHIRE 191-239 (1902).
o The election results for the years 1814, 1868, 1870, 1910, 1916, 1924, 1928, 1937,
1946, 1954 and 1962 are contained in a letter from Constance T. Rinden, Assistant Law
Librarian, New Hampshire State Library, to Author, October 9, 1968.
7 Letter from Constance T. Rinden to Author, October 28, 1969, indicates that there are
no sources available to indicate when mandatory referenda were submitted from 1833 to the
present. She indicates that in 1828 the expediency of taking the sense of the voters was referred
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to a committee which never reported it ou. The question was not raised in the legislature
until 1832, when action was taken. For these reasons, the 1833 referendum and subsequent
submissions to the people have all been included in this appendix.
S Although the vote taken showed a majority, the Senate and House of Representatives
at the June session, 1861, failed to agree upon a bill for a convention. Colby, supra note 5 at
218.
9The legislature, at the June session, 1865, by joint resolution decided to take no action.
Id.
10 That the citizens of this State may have an opportunity to amend or change this
constitution in a peaceable manner, if to them it shall seem expedient, the persons
qualified to vote for representatives shall, at the general election to be held in the
year one thousand, seven hundred and ninty-seven, vote also, by ballot, for or against
a convention, as they shall severally choose to do; and if thereupon it shall appear
that a majority of all the citizens in the State voting for representatives have voted
for a convention, the general assembly shall direct that a similar ballot shall be taken
the next year; and if thereupon it shall also appear that a majority of all the citizens
in the State voting for representatives have voted for a convention, the general as-
sembly shall, at their next session, call a convention, to consist of as many members as
there shall be in the house of representatives, to be chosen in the same manner, (at
the same places and at the same time that representatives are,) by the citizens en-
titied to vote for representatives, and to meet within three months after the said
election for the purpose of readopting, amending, or changing this constitution. If it
shall appear upon the ballot of either year that a majority of the citizens voting for
representatives is not in favor of a convention being called, it shall not be done until
two-thirds of both branches of the legislature shall deem it expedient.
11 Executive Papers of Governor James Garrard, Section 1, Box 2, Jacket 8.
12No convention was called because the constitution required a second submission in
1798.
13 Executive Papers of Governor James Garrard, Section 1, Box 2, Jacket 9.
142 LITTELL, THE STATUTE LAW OF KENrCKY 211-12 (1810).
15 Every twelfth year, after this Constitution shall have taken effect, at the general
election held for Governor there shall be a poll opened in which the qualified elec-
tors of the State shall express, by vote, whether they are in favor of calling a conven-
tion or not; and if there should be a majority of all the votes given at such election
in favor of a convention, the Governor shall inform the next General Assembly
thereof, whose duty it shall be to provide, by law, for the election of the members to
the convention, the number thereof, and the time and place of their meeting, which
law shall not be passed unless agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to
both branches of the General Assembly, and which convention, when met, shall have
it in their power to raise, amend or change the Constitution. But as the holding
any part of the human creation in slavery or involuntary servitude can only originate
in usurpation and tyranny, no alteration of this Constitution shall ever take place
so as to introduce slavery or involuntary servitude in this State otherwise than for
the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
16 KETrLEBOROUGH, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA 608-10 (1916).
17 Id. at 610-12.
18 At the general election to be held in the year eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and in
each twentieth year thereafter, and also at such time as the Legislature may by law
provide, the question, 'Shall there be a Convention to revise the Constitution, and
amend the same?' shall be decided by the electors qualified to vote for members of the
Legislature; and in case a majority of the electors so qualified, voting at such elec-
tion, shall decide in favor of a Convention for such purpose, the Legislature at its
next session, shall provide by law for the election of delegates to such Conven-
tion.
19 The election results for the years 1866, 1886, 1916, 1936, and 1957 are found in
MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 316, 318, 322,
329, 339, (1967).
2 0 At the general election to be held in the year one thousand nine hundred and sixteen,
and every twentieth year thereafter, and also at such times as the Legislature
may by law provide, the question, 'Shall there be a convention to revise the Constitu-
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tion and amend the same?' shall be decided by the electors of the State; and in
case a majority of the electors voting thereon shall decide in favor of a convention
for such purpose, the electors of every senate district of the State, as then organ-
ized, shall elect three delegates at the next ensuing general election at which members
of the Assembly shall be chosen, and the electors of the State voting at the same
election shall elect fifteen delegates-at-large. The delegates so elected shall con-
vene at the capitol on the first Tuesday of April next ensuing after their election,
and shall continue their session until the business of such convention shall have been
completed. Every delegate shall receive for his services the same compensation
and the same mileage as shall then be annually payable to members of the Assembly.
A majority of the convention shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business,
and no amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for approval to the
electors as hereinafter provided, unless by the assent of a majority of all the dele-
gates elected to the convention, the yeas and nays being entered on the journal to be
kept. The convention shall have the power to appoint such officers, employ&s and
assistants as it may deem necessary, and fix their compensation and to provide for
the printing of its documents, journal and proceedings, choose its own officers,
and be the judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members. In case
of a vacancy, by death, resignation or other cause, of any district delegate elected
to the convention, such vacancy shall be filled by a vote of the remaining delegates
representing the district in which such vacancy occurs. If such vacancy occurs in the
office of a delegate-at-large, such vacancy shall be filled by a vote of the remaining
delegates-at-large. Any proposed constitution or constitutional amendment which
shall have been adopted by such convention, shall be submitted to a vote of the
electors of the State at the time and in the manner provided by such convention, at
an election which shall be held not less than six weeks after the adjournment of such
convention. Upon the approval of such constitution or constitutional amendments,
in the manner provided in the last preceding section, such constitution or constitu-
tional amendment, shall go into effect on the first day of January next after such
approval.
21 Because the constitution is self-executing, no legislation was necessary.
2The New York Constitution of 1895, article XIV, section 2 was amended on Novem-
ber 8, 1938, and was renumbered article XIX, section 2. This provision states:
At the general election to be held in the year nineteen hundred fifty-seven, and every
twentieth year thereafter, and also at such times as the legislature may by law
provide, the question Shall there be a convention to revise the constitution and
amend the same? shall be submitted to and decided by the electors of the state;
and in case a majority of the electors voting thereon shall decide in favor of a con-
vention for such purpose, the electors of every senate district of the state, as then
organized, shall elect three delegates at the next ensuing general election, and the
electors of the state voting at the same election shall elect fifteen delegates-at-
large. The delegates so elected shall convene at the capitol on the first Tuesday of
April next ensuing after their election, and shall continue their session until the busi-
ness of such convention shall have been completed. Every delegates shall receive
for his services the same compensation as shall then be annually payable to the
members of the assembly and be reimbursed for actual traveling expenses, while the
convention is in session, to the extent that a member of the assembly would then
be entitled thereto in the case of a session of the legislature. A majority of the
convention shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and no amend-
ment to the constitution shall be submitted for approval to the electors as hereinafter
provided, unless by the assent of a majority of all the delegates elected to the conven-
tion, the ayes and noes being entered on the journal to be kept. The convention
shall have the power to appoint such officers, employees and assistants as it may deem
necessary, and fix their compensation and to provide for the printing of its docu-
ments, journal, proceedings and other expenses of said convention. The convention
shall determine the rules of its own proceedings, choose its own officers, and be the
judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members. In case of a va-
cancy, by death, resignation or other cause, of any district delegate elected to the
convention, such vacancy shall be filled by a vote of the remaining delegates repre-
senting the district in which such vacancy occurs. If such vacancy occurs in the
office of a delegate-at-large, such vacancy shall be filled by a vote of the remaining
delegates-at-large. Any proposed constitution or constitutional amendment which
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shall have been adopted by such convention, shall be submitted to a vote of the
electors of the state at the time and in the manner provided by such convention, at
an election which shall be held not less than six weeks after the adjournment of
such convention. Upon the approval of such constitution or constitutional amend-
ment, in the manner provided in the last preceding section, such constitution or
constitutional amendment shall go into effect on the first day of January next after
such approval.
23 The Michigan Constitution of 1850, article XX, section 2 provided, in part:
At the general election to be held in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-
six, and in each sixteenth year thereafter, and also at such other times as the legis-
lature may by law provide, the question of a general revision of the constitution
shall be submitted to the electors qualified to vote for members of the legislature;
and in case a majority of the electors so qualified, voting at such election, shall de-
ide in favor of a convention for such purpose, the legislature, at the next session,
shall provide by law for the election of delegates to such convention.
An 1862 amendment did not change the substance of this section.
24The election results for the years 1866, 1882, 1898, 1926, 1942, 1958 and 1961 are
contained in a letter from Bernard J. Apol, Director of Elections, to Author, September 5,
1968.
25No call for a convention was forthcoming because a majority of all the voters in the
election did not vote affirmatively as was necessary to require a convention to be held.
26 The Michigan Constitution of 1908, article XVII, section 4 provided:
At the general election to be held in the year nineteen hundred twenty-six, in each
sixteenth year thereafter and at such other times as may be provided by law, the
question of a general revision of the Constitution shall be submitted to the electors
qualified to vote for members of the Legislature. In case a majority of such electors
voting at such election shall decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, at
the next biennial spring election the electors of each senatorial district of the State
as then organized shall elect three delegates. The delegates so elected shall convene
at the State capitol on the first Tuesday in September next succeeding such election,
and shall continue their sessions until the business of the convention shall be com-
pleted. A majority of the delegates elected shall constitute a quorum for the trans-
action of business. The convention shall choose its own officers, determine the
rules of its proceedings and judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its
members. In case of a vacancy by death, resignation or otherwise, of any delegate,
such vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the Governor of a qualified resi-
dent of the same district. The convention shall have power to appoint such officers,
employes and assistants as it may deem necessary and to fix their compensation,
and to provide for the printing and distribution of its documents, journals and
proceedings. Each delegate shall receive for his services the sum of one thousand
dollars and the same mileage as shall then be payable to members of the Legisla-
ture, but such compensation may be increased by law. No proposed Constitution
or amendment adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the electors for
approval as hereinafter provided unless by the assent of a majority of all the dele-
gates elected to the convention, the yeas and nays being entered on the journal. Any
proposed Constitution or amendments adopted by such convention shall be sub-
mitted to the qualified electors in the manner provided by such convention on the
first Monday in April following the final adjournment of the convention; but,
in case an interval of at least ninety days shall not intervene between such final
adjournment and the date of such election, then it shall be submitted at the next
general election. Upon the approval of such Constitution or amendments by a major-
ity of the qualified electors voting thereon such Constitution or amendments shall
take effect on the first day of January following the approval thereof.
This section was amended by initiative petition and ratified at election on November 8, 1960.
This amendment provided:
At the biennial spring election to be held in the year 1961, at each sixteenth year
thereafter and at such times as may be provided by law, the question of a general
revision of the constitution shall be submitted to the electors qualified to vote
for members of the legislature. In case a majority of the electors voting on the
question shall decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, at an election to be
held not later than 4 months after the proposal shall have been certified as ap-
proved, the electors of each house of representatives district as then organized shall
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elect 1 delegate for each state representative to which the district is entitled and the
electors of each senatorial district as then organized shall elect 1 delegate for each
state senator to which the district is entitled. The delegates so elected shall convene
at the capital city on the first Tuesday in October next succeeding such election,
and shall continue their sessions until the business of the convention shall be
completed. A majority of the delegates elected shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business. The convention shall choose its own officers, determine the
rules of its proceedings and judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its
members. In case of a vacancy by death, resignation or otherwise, of any delegate,
such vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the governor of a qualified resident
of the same district. The convention shall have power to appoint such officers,
employees and assistants as it may deem necessary and to fix their compensation, and
to provide for the printing and distribution of its documents, journals and proceed-
ings. Each delegate shall receive for his services the sum of 1,000 dollars and the
same mileage as shall then be payable to members of the legislature, but such com-
pensation may be increased by law. No proposed constitution or amendment
adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the electors for approval as here-
inafter provided unless by the assent of a majority of all the delegates elected to
the convention, the yeas and nays being entered on the journal. Any proposed con-
stitution or amendments adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the
qualified electors in the manner provided by such convention on the first Monday
in April following the final adjournment of the convention; but, in case an interval
of at least 90 days shall not intervene between such final adjournment and the date
of such election, then it shall be submitted at the next general election. Upon the
approval of such constitution or amendments by a majority of the qualified electors
voting thereon such constitution or amendments shall take effect on the first day of
January following the approval thereof.
27 No call for a convention was forthcoming because a majority of all the voters in the
election did not vote affirmatively. See Stoliker v. Walte, 359 Mich. 65, 101 N.W.2d
299 (1960).
28 Constitutional provision is self-executing so no enabling legislation was necessary.
20 At the general election to be held in the year 1978, and in the 16th year thereafter
and at such times as may be provided by law, the question of a general revision of the
constitution shall be submitted to the electors of the state. If a majority of the elec-
tors voting on the question decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, at an
election to be held not later than six months after the proposal was certified as ap-
proved, the electors of each representative district as then organized shall elect
one delegate and the electors of each senatorial district as then organized shall
elect one delegate at a partisan election. The delegates so elected shall convene at
the seat of government on the first Tuesday in October next succeeding such elec-
tion or at an earlier date if provided by law.
30 It shall be the duty of the legislature, at its first session immediately succeeding the
returns of every census of the United States, hereafter taken, to pass a law for ascer-
taining at the next general election of delegates, the sense of the people of Maryland
in regard to the calling of a convention for altering the constitution; and in case
the majority of votes cast at said election shall be in favor of calling a convention,
the legislature shall provide for assembling such convention, and electing delegates
thereto at the earliest convenient day; and the delegates to the said convention
shall be elected by the several counties of the State and the city of Baltimore, in
proportion to their representation respectively in the senate and house of dele-
gates at the time when said convention may be called.
31 MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMIssION, REPORT 49, 444-45 (1967).
3 2 At the general election to be held in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-
two, and in each twentieth year thereafter, the question, 'Shall there be a conven-
tion to revise, alter or amend the constitution,' shall be submitted to the electors of
the State, and in any case a majority of all the electors voting at such election shall
decide in favor of a convention, the general assembly at its next session shall
provide by law for the election of delegates and the assembling of such convention,
as is provided in the preceding section; but no amendment of this constitution agreed
upon by any convention assembled in pursuance of this article shall take effect until
the same shall have been submitted to the electors of this State, and adopted
by a majority of those voting thereon.
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3 3 The Maryland Constitution of 1867, article XIV, section 2 as originally adopted pro-
vided, in part:
It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide by Law for taking, at the
general election to be held in the year eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, and every
twenty years thereafter, the sense of the people in regard to calling a convention for
altering this Constitution; and if a majority of voters at such election or elec-
tions shall vote for a convention, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall pro-
vide by Law for the assembling of such convention, and for the election of Delegates
thereto. Each County and Legislative District of the City of Baltimore shall have
in such convention a number of Delegates equal to its representation in both Houses
at the time at which the convention is called.
The Maryland Constitution of 1867, article XIV, section 2 was amended in 1922 by the addi-
tion of article XVII, section 9 which provided:
The vote to be held under the provisions of section two of article fourteen of the
Constitution for the purpose of taking the sense of the people in regard to calling a
Constitutional Convention shall be held at the general election in the year nineteen
hundred and thirty, and every twenty years thereafter.
Article XVII, section 9 was repealed in 1956 and article XIV, section 2 was amended to
provide, in part:
It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide by Law for taking, at the
general election to be held in the year nineteen hundred and seventy, and every
twenty years thereafter, the sense of the People in regard to calling a Convention
for altering this Constitution; and if a majority of voters at such election or elec-
tions shall vote for a Convention, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall
provide by Law for the assembling of such convention, and for the election of Dele-
gates thereto. Each County, and Legislative District of the City of Baltimore, shall
have in such Convention a number of Delegates equal to its representation in both
Houses at the time at which the Convention is called.
34 The election results for the years 1887, 1907, 1930 and 1950 are found in MARYLAND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMiISSION, REPORT 65 (1967).
35 Id. at 433-34.
36id. at 433-34.
37 The Ohio Constitution of 1851, article XVI, section 3 provided:
At the general election, to be held in the year one thousand eight hundred and sev-
enty-one, and in each twentieth year thereafter, the question: 'Shall there be a con-
vention to revise, alter, or amend the constitution?' shall be submitted to the electors
of the state; and, in case a majority of all the electors, voting at such election, shall
decide in favor of a convention, the General Assembly, at its next session shall pro-
vide, by law, for the election of delegates, and the assembling of such convention,
as it provided in the preceding section; but no amendment of this constitution, agreed
upon by any convention assembled in pursuance of this article, shall take effect, until
the same shall have been submitted to the electors of the state, and adopted by a
majority of those voting thereon.
This section was amended on September 3, 1912, to provide:
At the general election to be held in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty-
two, and in each twentieth year thereafter, the question: 'Shall there be a con-
vention to revise, alter, or amend the constitution' shall be submitted to the electors
of the state; and in case a majority of the electors, voting for and against the calling
of a convention, shall decide in favor of a convention, the general assembly, at its
next session, shall provide, by law, for the election of delegates, and the assembling
of such convention, as is provided in the preceding section; but no amendment of this
constitution, agreed upon by any convention assembled in pursuance of this article,
shall take effect, until the same shall have been submitted to the electors of the state,
and adopted by a majority of those voting thereon.
38 The election results for the years 1871, 1891, 1910, 1932 and 1952 are found in
AppendLx 580, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. (Page 1955).
39 The Iowa Constitution of 1857, article X, section 3 provides:
At the general election to be held in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy,
and in each tenth year thereafter, and also at such times as the General Assembly may,
by law, provide, the question, 'Shall there be a Convention to revise the Constitution,
and amend the same?' shall be decided by the electors qualified to vote for members
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of the General Assembly; and in case a majority of the electors so qualified, voting
at such election for and against such proposition, shall decide in favor of a conven-
tion for such purpose, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall provide by
law for the election of delegates to such Convention.
This section was amended in 1964 to provide, in part:
At the general election to be held in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy,
and in each tenth year thereafter, and also at such times as the General Assembly may,
by law, provide, the question, 'Shall there be a Convention to revise the Constitution,
and propose amendment or amendments to same?' shall be decided by the electors quali-
fied to vote for members of the General Assembly; and in case a majority of the elec-
tors so qualified, voting at such election, for and against such proposition, shall decide
in favor of a Convention for such purpose, the General Assembly, at its next session,
shall provide by law for the election of delegates to such Convention, and for sub-
mitring the results of said Convention to the people, in such manner and at such
time as the General Assembly shall provide.
4 0 Election results for the years 1870, 1880, and 1890 are found in DOCUMENTARY MA-
TERIAL RELATING TO TlE HISTORY OF IOWA, 282-83 (B. F. SHAMBAUGH ed. 1897).
41 19 IOwA OFFICIAL REGISTER 363 (1901).
42 24 IOWA OFFICIAL REGISTER 457 (1911-1912).
43 29 IowA OFFICIAL REGISTER 483 (1921-1922).
4 4 SHAMBAUGH, CoNSTrToNs OF IOWA 281-83 (1934).
4 5 Letter from Robert C. Landes, Deputy Secretary of State, to Author, September 6, 1968.
40Des Moines Register, January 1, 1961, at 10, col. 6.
47 44 IOWA OFFICIAL REGISTER 318 (1951-1952).
48 49 IOWA OFFICIAL REGISTER 369 (1961-1962).
4 0 The Virginia Constitution of 1870, article XII provides, in part:
At the general election to be held in year 1888, and in each twentieth year thereafter,
and also at such time as the general assembly may by law provide, the question, 'Shall
there be a convention to revise the constitution and amend the same?' shall be decided
by the electors qualified to vote for members of the general assembly; and in case a
majority of the electors so qualified voting at such election shall decide in favor of
a convention for such purpose, the general assembly at its next session shall provide
by law for the election of delegates to such convention: Provided, That no amendment
or revision shall be made which shall deny or in any way impair the right of suffage,
or any civil or political right as conferred by this constitution, except for causes which
apply to all persons and classes without distinction.
The 1887 Code of Virginia numbers this provision as section 2; however, The Acts of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the State of Virginia (1870), The Code of Virginia (1873), and 7 THORPE,
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3897-98 (1909) treat this and the preceding pro-
vision as one article without sections.
50 W. VAN SCHRERVEN, THE CONVENTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONS OF VIRGINIA, 1776-
1966, 15 (1967).
51 No convention shall be called by the legislature to propose alterations, revisions,
or amendments to this constitution, or to propose a new constitution, unless the law
providing for such convention shall first be approved by the people on a referendum
vote at a regular or special election, and any amendments, alterations, revisions, or
new constitution, proposed by such convention, shall be submitted to the electors
of the State at a general or special election and be approved by a majority of the electors
voting thereon, before the same shall become effective: Provided, That the question
of such proposed convention shall be submitted to the people at least once in every
twenty years.
52 Election results for the years 1926 and 1950 are contained in a letter from Basil R. Wil-
son, Secretary, State Election Board, to Author, September 18, 1968.
53 Letter from Basil R. Wilson, Secretary, State Election Board, to Author, May, 1970.
4 This section was submitted by initiative and adopted November 2, 1920. The provision
states:
The question 'Shall there be a convention to revise and amend the Constitution?' shall
be submitted to the electors of the state at a special election to be held on the first
Tuesday in August, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one, and at each general
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election next ensuing the lapse of twenty successive years since the last previous sub-
mission thereof, and in case a majority of the electors voting for and against the calling
of a convention shall vote for a convention, the governor shall issue writs of election
to the sheriffs of the different counties, ordering the election of delegates, and the
assembling of such convention, as is provided in the preceding section.
r5 OFFICIAL MANUAL STATE OF MISSOUI 478-79 (1921-22).
5 6 The convention was called by the governor, as provided by the Missouri Constitution
article XV, section 4.
57 OFFICIAL MANUAL STATE OF MISSOURI 397-98 (1943-44).
0 The convention was called by the governor, as provided by the Missouri Constitution
article XV, section 4.
59 This section provides, in part:
At the general election on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November,
1962, and every twenty years thereafter, the secretary of state shall, and at any general
or special election the general assembly by law may, submit to the electors of the
state the question 'Shall there be a convention to revise and amend the Constitution?'.
The question shall be submitted on a separate ballot without party designation, and if
a majority of the votes cast thereon is for the affirmative, the governor shall call an
election of delegates to the convention on a day not less than three nor more than six
months after the election on the question. At the election the electors of the state
shall elect fifteen delegates-at-large and the electors of each state senatorial district
shall elect two delegates. Each delegate shall possess the qualifications of a senator;
and no person holding any other office of trust or profit (officers of the organized
militia, school directors, justices of the peace and notaries public excepted) shall be
eligible to be elected a delegate. To secure representation from different political
parties in each senatorial district, in the manner prescribed by its senatorial district
committee each political party shall nominate but one candidate for delegate from
each senatorial district, the certificate of nomination shall be filed in the office of the
secretary of state at least thirty days before the election, each candidate shall be voted
for on a separate ballot bearing the parry designation, each elector shall vote for
but one of the candidates, and the two candidates receiving the highest number of
votes in each senatorial district shall be elected. Candidates for delegates-at-large
shall be nominated by nominating petitions only, which shall be signed by electors of
the state equal to five percent of the legal voters in the senatorial district in which
the candidate resides until otherwise provided by law, and shall be verified as provided
by law for initiative petitions, and filed in the office of the secretary of state at
least thirty days before the election. All such candidates shall be voted for on a
separate ballot without party designation, and the fifteen receiving the highest num-
ber of votes shall be elected. Not less than fifteen days before the election, the
secretary of state shall certify to the county clerk of the county the name of each per-
son nominated for the office of delegate from the senatorial district in which the
county, or any part of it, is included, and the names of all persons nominated for
delegates-at-large.
60 OFFICIAL MANUAL STATE OF MISSOURI 1179 (1963-64).
61 If during any ten-year period a constitutional convention has not been held, the
secretary of state shall place on the ballot for the next general election the question:
'Shall there be a Constitutional Convention?' If a majority of the votes cast on the
question are in the negative, the question need not be placed on the ballot until the
end of the next ten-year period. If a majority of the votes cast on the question are
in the affirmative, delegates to the convention shall be chosen at the next regular
statewide election, unless the legislature provides for the election of the delegates
at a special election. The secretary of state shall issue the call for the convention.
Unless other provisions have been made by law, the call shall conform as nearly as
possible to the act calling the Alaska Constitutional Convention of 1955, including,
but not limited to, number of members, districts, election and certification of dele-
gates, and submission and ratification of revisions and ordinances. The appropria-
tion provisions of the call shall be self-executing and shall constitute a first claim
on the state treasury.
6 Letter from Thelma Cutler, Director of Elections to Author, October 21, 1969:
The question of a constitutional convention will appear on the ballot in the 1970
General Election and the voters will vote on the question at that time.
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63 This section provides, in part:
The legislature may submit to the electorate at any general or special election the
question, 'Shall there be a convention to propose a revision of or amendments to the
Constitution?'. If any ten-year period shall elapse during which the question shall
not have been submitted, the lieutenant governor shall certify the question, to be
voted on at the first general election following the expiration of such period. If a
majority of the ballots cast upon such question be in the affirmative, delegates to
the convention shall be chosen at the next regular election unless the legislature shall
provide for the election of delegates at a special election . . . Unless the legislature
shall otherwise provide, there shall be the same number of delegates to the con-
vention, who shall be elected from the same areas, and the convention shall be
convened in the same manner and have the same powers and privileges, as nearly as
practicable, as provided for the convention of 1968.
The only change in this language adopted in 1968 was the reference to the 1968 convention in
place of the 1950 convention.
6 4 Hawaii held a convention in 1968 pursuant to a 1966 referendum authorized by the legis-
lature. Porteus, The Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1968, 42 STATE GOV. 97 (1969).
Thus another vote is not required in Hawaii until 1976.
0 The question 'Shall there be a Constitutional Convention to amend or revise the Con-
stitution of the State?' shall be submitted to all the electors of the state at the gen-
eral election held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in the even-
numbered year next succeeding the expiration of a period of twenty years from the
date of convening of the last convention called to revise or amend the constitution
of the state, including the Constitutional Convention of 1965, or next succeeding the
expiration of a period of twenty years from the date of submission of such a ques-
tion to all electors of the state, whichever date shall last occur. If a majority of the
electors voting on the question shall signify 'yes', the general assembly shall pro-
vide for such convention as provided in Section 3 of this article.
In providing for the convening of a constitutional convention to amend or revise the
constitution of the state the general assembly shall, upon roll call, by a yea vote of at
least two-thirds of the total membership of each house, prescribe by law the manner
of selection of the membership of such convention, the date of convening of such
convention, which shall be not later than one year from the date of the roll call vote
under Section 1 of this article or one year from the date of the election under Sec-
tion 2 of this article, as the case may be, and the date for final adjournment of such
convention.
00 This section is included in the proposed new constitution of Arkansas which will be
submitted to the voters at the 1970 general election The section provides:
A constitutional convention may be called by law, by initiative or by the voters of
the State at a general election upon submission of the question by resolution of the
General Assembly. If a constitutional convention has not been held or if the
question of calling a convention has not been submitted to the voters of the State for
a period of twenty years, then the question shall be submitted at the next general
election. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the holding of a conven-
tion within one year after a majority of those voting on the question approves
the calling of a convention.
07 This section has tentatively been approved by the 1969-70 Illinois constitutional con-
vention. It is subject to being finally included in the convention's draft constitution and
being approved by the Illinois voters in December, 1970. The section provides, in part:
In the year 1990 and every twenty years thereafter the Secretary of State shall sub-
mit to the electors at the general election in that year the question of whether a
Constitutional Convention should be called, unless there has been a similar sub-
mission during the preceding twenty years.
The vote on calling a Convention shall be on a separate ballot. A Convention shall
be called if three-fifths of those voting on the question vote in the affirmative.
The General Assembly shall, at the next session following approval by the electorate,
provide for the Convention and for the election on a non-partisan ballot of two
delegates from each senatorial district. The General Assembly shall designate the
day, hour and place of the Convention's initial meeting, which shall be within three
months after the election of delegates. The General Assembly shall fix the pay of
delegates and officers, and provide for that pay together with all expenses necessarily
incurred by the Convention in the performance of its duties.
